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Collusion-Resistance in Optimistic Fair Exchange
Yang Wang, Willy Susilo∗, Senior Member, IEEE, Man Ho Au, Member, IEEE, and Guilin Wang
Abstract—Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a type of crypto-
graphic protocols aimed at solving the fair exchange problem
over open networks with the help of a third party to settle
disputes between exchanging parties. It is well known that a third
party is necessary in the realization of a fair exchange protocol.
However, a fully trusted third party may not be available over
open networks. In the literature, the security of most of the
proposed OFE protocols depends on the assumption that the
third party is semi-trusted in the sense that it may misbehave on
its own but does not conspire with either of the main parties. The
existing security models of OFE have not taken into account the
case where the potentially dishonest third party may collude with
a signer in the sense of sharing its secret key with the signer. In
this work, to reduce the trust level of the arbitrator and increase
the security of OFE, we propose an enhanced security model
that, for the first time, captures this scenario. We also show a
separation between the existing model and our enhanced model
with a concrete counter example. Finally, we revisit two popular
approaches in the construction of OFE protocols, which are based
on verifiably encrypted signature and conventional signature plus
ring signature, respectively. Our result shows that conventional
signature plus ring signature approach approach remains valid
in our enhanced model. However, for schemes based on verifiably
encrypted signature, slight modifications are needed to guarantee
the security.
Index Terms—Optimistic Fair Exchange, collusion, enhanced
model.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE widely use of open networks such as Internet hasresulted in a growing prosperity of electronic commerce.
Under normal circumstances, the networks where the ex-
changes take place are insecure and the participants may not
trust each other. Disputes may occur during the exchange
even if both participants act honestly. Thus, the fair exchange
issue, namely how two mutually distrustful parties exchange
digital items over open computer networks in a fair way, has
been considered as a fundamental problem in both electronic
transactions and cryptography.
In 1997, Asokan, Schunter and Waidner [1] introduced the
notion of optimistic fair exchange (OFE) to solve this problem.
An optimistic fair exchange protocol comprises three kinds of
participants: a signer, a verifier and a third party named an
“arbitrator”. Typically such a protocol is conducted in three
message flows. First, Alice, the signer, initiates the protocol
by delivering a partial signature to Bob the verifier. A valid
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partial signature not only serves as evidence to Bob that Alice
has committed to endorse a certain message, but also assures
Bob that he will receive Alice’s full signature at the end of the
protocol. The assurance depends on the fact that the arbitrator
is capable of converting the partial signature into a full one. In
the second step, Bob delivers his full signature to Alice. Later,
if Alice is honest, she will send her full signature to Bob in
the third step, and this completes the exchange process. Note
that under the normal situation, participation of the arbitrator
is not required and thus, the term “optimistic”.
It is well-known that fairness can not be achieved without
the involvement of such a third party [2]. However, this does
not mean that the arbitrator in OFE has to be fully trusted. In
fact, a fully trusted third party is typically undesirable as it
is hard to find such an entity over open networks. To reduce
the trust level of the third party and the difficulty of selecting
such an entity, Franklin and Reiter [3] considered possible
misbehavior by the third party and suggest to use a semi-
trusted third party in the sense that it may misbehave on its
own but does not conspire with either of the main parties.
Franklin and Reiter believe the third party could even be a
random member of the network when such a semi-trusted
assumption is ensured.
Note that the arbitrator in OFE should correctly make
a resolution. If the arbitrator converts the signer’s partial
signature into a full one without a verifier having submitted
his own full signature, the signer will be disadvantaged. On
the other hand, if the arbitrator refuses to convert the signer’s
partial signature into a full one even if a verifier has submitted
his own full signature, the verifier will be disadvantaged.
Without this basic assumption that the arbitrator correctly
make a resolution, the fairness of OFE will not be guaranteed.
However, since the third party could be a random member
of the network, it seems realistic that it may potentially help
one party like its business partner. Thus the collusion of the
arbitrator with the signer or the verifier should be taken into
account, as long as the arbitrator correctly makes the required
resolution request whenever needed. In this paper we consider
the scenario that the arbitrator may implicitly collude with the
signer in the sense of sharing its secret arbitrator key with
the signer. If the fairness for the verifier can still be achieved
when this collusion is considered, the trust for the arbitrator
will be reduced for the verifier side. This is meaningful in
practice, as it is easier for the signer to choose an arbitrator
unilaterally than both mutually distrusted parties to choose a
common trusted third party as an arbitrator.
A. Related Work
Since its introduction, optimistic fair exchange (OFE) [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8] has been extensively studied. Two representa-
tive primitives for constructing OFE are verifiably encrypted
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signatures [9], [10], [5], [6], [7] and sequential two-party
multisignatures [4]. Some desirable properties in OFE, such
as abuse-free [11], verifiability of the third party [12] (also
known as accountability in [9]), resolution ambiguity [13],
stand-alone [14], setup-free [14] and signer ambiguity [15],
have also been proposed in the literature. Resolution ambiguity
means that the full signatures generated by the signer should
be computationally indistinguishable from those generated by
the arbitrator, and it has been considered as a fundamental
requirement for OFE schemes [4], [16], [17], [18], [15], [19].
As the intervention of an arbitrator could be caused by a
network failure rather than by the cheating of a signer, an
OFE scheme with resolution ambiguity can avoid bad publicity
for the signer. Another motivation for resolution ambiguity is
that the holder of a full signature generated by the arbitrator
should not be treated differently by others from one with a full
signature generated by the signer. In the following, we review
the formal security definitions for OFE schemes.
Early security definitions of OFE only considered the single-
user case, i.e., there is only one signer, one verifier along with
one arbitrator. The models proposed in [1], [9] considered the
cases where the signer or verifier could be a dishonest cheater
but the arbitrator itself was assumed to always act honestly.
Franklin and Reiter [3] for the first time considered the case
where the arbitrator could be dishonest. Later, Dodis and
Reyzin [4] explicitly proposed a model to cover the scenario
that the dishonest arbitrator tries to forge a signature on behalf
of the signer. In particular, the model still assumes that the
arbitrator will not collude with the signer or with the receiver
and is semi-trusted.
In practice, due to the number of users, it would be logical
to allow a number of users to share the same arbitrator. In
2007, Dodis, Lee and Yum [16] studied OFE in the multi-user
setting, where there are many signers and verifiers along with
one arbitrator in a system. In the multi-user setting, dishonest
users are allowed to collude to cheat a target user. Dodis et
al. [16] pointed out that the security of an OFE in the single-
user setting does not necessarily guarantee that in the multi-
user setting. Independently, the multi-user security of OFE was
also studied by Zhu, Susilo and Mu [17].
The certified-key model (also known as the registered-key
model [20]) is widely used in studying the security of OFE
protocols. In this model, whenever a query with respect to a
public key is made, the adversary must show its knowledge
of the corresponding private key. In 2008, Huang et al. [18]
studied OFE in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model,
where the adversary can make queries with respect to arbitrary
public keys, without requiring to know the corresponding
private keys. They separated the security of OFE between the
certified-key model and the chosen-key model through a con-
crete example. A new paradigm of constructing OFE protocols
secure in their model was also proposed by employing ring
signatures.
B. Motivation
The correctness of an OFE system requires that the arbitra-
tor is capable of converting the partial signature into a full one.
To what extend this statement is true is often overlooked. In
fact, existing model only guarantees that no signer can create
a partial signature that cannot be converted into a full one by
the arbitrator based on the public parameter of the system as
well as the arbitrator’s public key. It is not clear whether or not
the statement still hold if the attacker is given the arbitrator’s
secret key as well.
Thus, a natural and practical question is “if a malicious
signer has access to the secret key of the arbitrator, would
the verifier be disadvantaged?” This explicitly captures the
situation that the potentially dishonest arbitrator to some extent
colludes with the signer by offering the signer access to the
secret arbitration key. We provide an affirmative answer to this
question by demonstrating that a malicious signer is able to
produce a valid partial signature that passes the verification of
the verifier, but that partial signature would not be convertible
to a full signature. In other words, a signer who has access to
the arbitrator’s secret key could be able to obtain the verifier’s
item without committing to anything else. Thus, there is a need
to enhance the existing model to capture this attack, and to
develop schemes that can be proven secure in this enhanced
model.
C. Our Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions.
1) We propose an enhanced security model that captures
the previously overlooked case in OFE schemes, in
which the potentially dishonest arbitrator may collude
with a signer by offering its secret arbitration key. Our
enhanced security model assures collusion-resistance in
OFE. We also show that our enhanced model is strictly
stronger than existing multi-user setting and chosen-
key model with a concrete example that shows the
separation.
2) After defining the enhanced security model, we investi-
gate the security of the existing schemes in our enhanced
model. We revisit two well-known methodologies for
constructing OFE schemes, namely verifiably encrypted
signatures, and the combination of conventional signa-
tures and ring signatures. Our result shows that these
paradigms will remain secure in our enhanced model.
II. SYNTAX AND EXISTING SECURITY MODEL
Throughout the paper, the following notations are used. Let
k ∈ N be a security parameter. For a finite set S, s ← S
denotes that an element s is chosen uniformly at random from
S. By y ← AO(x), we mean the algorithm A, on input x and
having access to oracle O, outputs y. By x := y, we mean
variable x is assigned with the value of y.
A. Definition
Definition 1: A non-interactive OFE scheme involves sign-
ers, verifiers and the arbitrator, and consists of the following
(probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms:
• SetupArb: On input 1k, the algorithm outputs the arbitra-
tor’s secret/public key pair (ASK,APK).
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• SetupUser: On input 1k and APK, it generates a user’s
secret/public key pair (SK,PK). In this paper (SKi,PKi)
is used to denote the user Ui’s key pair.
• Sig and Ver: These are the (full) signing and verification
algorithms of OFE respectively. Sig(m,SKi,APK), out-
puts a full signature σ under PKi on message m, where m
is chosen by user Ui from the message space M, while
Ver(m, σ, PKi,APK) outputs > or ⊥, indicating σ is
Ui’s valid full signature on message m or not.
• PSig and PVer: These are partial signing and verification
algorithms respectively. PSig(m,SKi,APK) generates a
partial signature σP on message m under the public key
PKi, while PVer(m,σP , PKi,APK) outputs > or ⊥,
indicating σP is valid with respect to message m and
the public key PKi or not.
• Res: The arbitrator runs this resolution algorithm when
making a resolution. Res(m,σP ,ASK,PKi) outputs ei-
ther a full signature σ on message m under the public
key PKi, or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial
signature.
Correctness property means the output is what we want if
everybody follows the algorithms. More specifically, it states
that
• Ver(m,Sig(m,SKi,APK),PKi,APK) = >,
PVer(m,PSig(m,SKi,APK),PKi,APK) = >, and
Ver(m,Res(m,PSig(m,SKi,APK),ASK,PKi),PKi,APK)
= >.
Resolution ambiguity property states that any “resolved sig-
nature” Res(m,PSig(m,SKi,APK),ASK,PKi) outputted by
the arbitrator based on the signer’s partial signature is com-
putationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature”
Sig(m,SKi,APK) generated by the signer.
B. Security in Multi-User setting and Chosen-key Model
The security of an OFE scheme comprises three aspects:
security against signers, security against verifiers, and security
against the arbitrator. The security in the multi-user setting
and chosen-key model [18] is captured by the following three
experiments, in which the adversary can make queries to the
resolution oracles with respect to adversarially chosen public
keys and may not even know the corresponding secret keys.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. Intuitively this aspect of
security requires that every valid partial signature generated by
the signer can be resolved to a full signature by the arbitrator.
Formally, we require that no PPT adversary A can succeed in




σ ← Res(m,σP ,ASK,PK∗)






where oracle ORes takes as input a tuple (m,σP ,PKi) such
that PVer(m,σP ,PKi,APK) = >) (i.e., a valid partial signa-
ture σP on message m under the public key PKi), and outputs
a full signature σ.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. This aspect of security
requires that the verifier himself is not able to generate the
signer’s full signature even if given a partial one. Formally, we
require that no PPT adversary A can succeed in the following




success of A :=
[
∧ Ver(m,σ,PK,APK) = >
(m, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes)
]
where oracle ORes is the same as in the experiment of security
against signers, Query(A, ORes) is the queries A made to
oracle ORes, and oracle OPSig takes as input a message m
and outputs a partial signature σP under the challenge public
key PK. Note that the signing oracle which models the full
signatures outputted by the algorithm Sig is not needed, as it
can be functionally replaced by OPSig and ORes.
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. This aspect of
security requires that the arbitrator is not able to generate the
signer’s full signature unless holding a corresponding partial
one. Formally we require that no PPT adversary A can succeed




success of A :=
[
∧ Ver(m,σ,PK,APK) = >
m 6∈ Query(A, OPSig)
]
where ASK∗ is A’s state information, oracle OPSig is the
same as in the experiment of security against verifiers, and
Query(A, OPSig) is the queries A made to oracle OPSig.
III. THE ENHANCED MODEL
It is easy to see that the existing models do not capture the
possible collusion amongst the arbitrator and signer. That is,
when a dishonest signer has access to the arbitrator’s secret
key, security of the schemes proven in this model will be
unclear. To capture this case and make the security model more
practical, we propose the following enhanced model about
security against signers.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. We require that no PPT





σ ← Res(m,σP ,ASK,PK∗)






In other words, no signer, even with the knowledge of the
arbitrator’s secret key, should be able to produce a partial
signature that looks good to a verifier but cannot be resolved
to a full signature. The case that the arbitrator and a dishonest
signer may implicitly collude is captured by allowing the
adversary A having the arbitrator’s secret key as an input.
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A. Implications and Limitations of our Enhanced Model
Our model captures the case when the arbitrator’s key is
leaked to the attacker, or that someone having access to the
arbitration key is colluding with the attacker. One limitation
of our model is that it only captures the behavior of a
dishonest arbitrator whose secret key is generated in complete
accordance with the setup algorithm. This includes deleting
all randomness used during key generation but not explicitly
contained within the arbitration key. This is analogous to the
situation for certificateless cryptosystem in which the attacker
could be the key generation centre (KGC) itself. The nature of
the KGC is modelled in two ways: one assumes the attacker
has access to the KGC’s master key which is generated
honestly while the other assumes that the KGC’s master
key is created by the attacker. Readers are referred to [21]
for the discussion of the various models of certificateless
cryptosystem.
We choose to model an arbitrator whose secret key is
correctly generated for two reasons. Firstly, we make the
observation that existing models already fall short in capturing
attacks from such an arbitrator. Secondly, we find that existing
schemes following a certain design approach are immune
against this kind of attack. We leave the formalization of
a model that captures the behavior of an arbitrator who
adversarially chooses its public key and the construction of
schemes secure in this sense as an open problem.
In an orthogonal direction, we remark that a similar exten-
sion could not be applied to the security against verifiers. In
other words, the arbitrator must be completely honest to the
signer. Otherwise, the verifier could just convert the partial
signature from the signer with the help of the arbitrator without
the need to fulfill the obligation.
IV. SEPARATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL AND THE
EXISTING MODEL
In this section, we shall demonstrate a separation of our
enhanced model and the existing model [18], which was
reviewed in Section II-B. In order to do this, we will present
a concrete OFE scheme, called A*-OFE1, that is secure in
the multi-user setting and chosen key model reviewed in
Section II-B. Then, we will show a concrete attack against
this scheme in the enhanced model. This shows that our model
is strictly stronger than the existing model, as it is trivial to
show that the security in the enhanced model implies that in
the multi-user setting and chosen key model.
A. High Level Description
Prior to proposing the concrete construction that will serve
as a counterexample, we will first provide the high level
description. In this example, the full signature is a Schnorr
signature [22] (c, s) on a message m under the signer’s public
key X such that c = H(X||g||gsXc||m), where g is a
generator of the group G in the Schnorr signature setting and
H is a hash function. Suppose the order of g is of `-bit and in
1The name A*-OFE represents that the arbitrator may implicitly collude
with the signer in our enhanced model.
the following we use γ to denote the value `− 1. The partial
signature comprises c, S = gs, an encryption of the exponent
s and a proof that the encryption is done correctly. That is, to
generate a partial signature, the signer does the following.
1) The signer releases c and S = gs.
2) Let bj for j = 0 to γ be the binary representation of s.
That is, s =
∑γ
j=0 2
jbj , where bj ∈ {0, 1}.
3) Since no efficient encryption of exponents in the Schnorr
signature setting is known, the signer encrypts the indi-
vidual bits bj of s.
• The signer encodes bit 0 as the identity element in
group G while bit 1 is encoded as the generator g.
Thus to encrypt the j-th binary bit bj , the signer
equivalently encrypts the group element gbj .
• For j = 0 to γ, the signer independently and
randomly chooses rj and computes
Aj = g
rj , Bj = h
rj , Cj = g
bjY rj .
Note that (Aj , Bj , Cj) is in fact the encryption of
the bit bj under the arbitrator’s public key (h, Y ).
• The set of tuples (Aj , Bj , Cj) for j = 0 to γ
constitute the encryption of the exponent s.
4) The signer then makes a proof of knowledge that the
ciphertexts have been generated correctly. Naturally the
proof of knowledge consists of two parts.
• The first part ensures that the discrete logarithm of
the value encrypted in (Aj , Bj , Cj), when added
together after applying the proper weights, is the
exponent s. More specifically, the first part itself
is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a set
of values {sj , rj}γj=0 such that Aj = grj , Bj =
hrj , Cj = g




• The second part guarantees that the discrete log-
arithm of the value encrypted in (Aj , Bj , Cj) can
only be 0 or 1. It can be viewed as a zero knowledge
proof of knowledge of values Rj such that either
Cj = Y
Rj or Cj = gY Rj holds.
To convert a partial signature into a full one, the arbitrator
decrypts the ciphertexts and gains a sequence of plaintexts. If
all the plaintexts are either the identity element in group G
or the generator g, the arbitrator decodes the identity element
and g as bit 0 and 1, respectively, and outputs the value whose
binary representation is exactly the sequence of these bits.
Otherwise the arbitrator returns ⊥ to indicate failure in making
a resolution.
Since the signer has no access to the arbitrator’s secret key,
the proof of knowledge of a set of values {sj , rj}γj=0 such that
Cj = g
sjY rj , S = g
∑γ
j=0 2
jsj and the proof of knowledge of
values Rj such that Cj = Y Rj or Cj = gY Rj together would
imply that sj ∈ {0, 1} and rj = Rj . Thus the above proof of
the set of relationships achieve what the signer would like to
convince the verifier. That is, the sum of sj after applying the
appropriate weights would be the component s of the Schnorr
signature and that sj can only be 0 or 1. Thus the arbitrator
can decrypt the ciphertexts and output the exponent s such
that S = gs.
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B. Construction of A*-OFE
Formally we assume that we have a public group G with
a generator g of prime order q of ` bits. Denote by γ the
value ` − 1. We also assume a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → ZZq .
The construction of A*-OFE is as follows.
• SetupArb: The arbitrator chooses random elements h ∈ G
and y ∈ ZZq , and computes Y = gy . The public key is
set as APK = (h, Y ), and the arbitrator keeps ASK = y
as private.
• SetupUser: Each user Ui chooses a secret value xi ∈ ZZq ,
and calculates Xi = gxi . The user sets (SKi,PKi) =
(xi, Xi).
• PSig: To partially sign a message m, a user Ui does as
follows:
1) chooses a random t ∈ ZZq and then computes c ∈
ZZq and s ∈ ZZq such that
c = H(PKi||g||gt||m) and s = t− cxi (in ZZq).
2) let s =
∑γ
j=0 2
jbj , where for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, bj ∈
{0, 1}. Note that this binary representation always
exists and is unique in ZZq2. Let further S = gs and
Ej = g






3) Ui chooses uniformly at random 0 ≤ rj ≤ ZZq for
each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, and computes
Aj = g
rj , Bj = h
rj , Cj = g
bjY rj .
4) For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, if bj = 0, Ui chooses uniformly at
random elements tj0, cj1, sj1 ∈ ZZq and sets
Tj0 = Y




Otherwise, Ui chooses uniformly at random
cj0, sj0, tj1 ∈ ZZq , and sets
Tj0 = (Cj)




Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, Ui chooses uniformly at





t̃j , Ãj = g
tj , B̃j = h
tj , C̃j = g
t̃jY tj .
5) For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote T̃j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j and
T̃j
′
= Tj0||Tj1. Let A = T̃0|| · · · ||T̃γ , and B =
T̃0
′|| · · · ||T̃γ
′
. The user Ui computes
c̃ = H
(
PKi||c||S||m|| S̃ || A || B
)
.





jbj may not be unique. For example, suppose s = 1 ∈ ZZq and
that q < 2l − 1, two sets of {bj}γj=0 exist. They corresponds to the binary
representation of 1 and q + 1. However, later we will discuss this will not
affect the security of the scheme.
For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, if bj = 0, Ui computes
cj0 = c̃− cj1(in ZZq), sj0 = tj0 − cj0rj (in ZZq).
Otherwise, Ui computes
cj1 = c̃− cj0 (in ZZq), sj1 = tj1 − cj1rj (in ZZq).
Furthermore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, Ui computes
s̃j = t̃j − c̃bj (in ZZq), sj = tj − c̃rj (in ZZq).
6) For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote Tj = Aj ||Bj ||Cj . The partial
signature is set as σP := (c, S, T0, · · · , Tγ , c00, c01,
s00, s01, · · · , cγ0, cγ1, sγ0, sγ1, c̃, s̃0, s0, · · · , s̃γ ,
sγ).
• PVer: Given a partial signature σP from user Ui, a verifier
does as follows.
1) The verifier checks whether c, c̃ ∈ ZZq , and for 0 ≤
j ≤ γ,
cj0, cj1, sj0, sj1, s̃j , sj ∈ ZZq, cj0+cj1 = c̃ (in ZZq).
2) The verifier checks whether
c = H(PKi||g||S(Xi)c||m).




0 ≤ j ≤ γ,
Tj0 = (Cj)




4) Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, the verifier decomposes Tj
as Aj ||Bj ||Cj and computes
Ãj = g
sj (Aj)
c̃, B̃j = h
sj (Bj)
c̃, C̃j = g
s̃jY sj (Cj)
c̃.
5) Denote T̃j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j and T̃j
′
= Tj0||Tj1. Let
A = T̃0|| · · · ||T̃γ , and B = T̃0






PKi||c||S||m|| S̃ || A || B
)
.
6) If all the above equations hold, then the verifier
returns >, otherwise ⊥ is returned.
• Sig: To fully sign a message m, a user Ui chooses a
random t ∈ ZZq and then computes c ∈ ZZq and s ∈ ZZq
such that
c = H(PKi||g||gt||m) and s = t− cxi (in ZZq).
The full signature is set as σ := (c, s).
• Ver: Given a full signature σ := (c, s) from user Ui, a
verifier verifies whether c ∈ ZZq, s ∈ ZZq and
c = H(PKi||g||gs(Xi)c||m).
If so, > is returned and otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
• Res: For the user Ui’s partial signature σP , the arbitrator
1) first checks whether PVer(m,σP ,PKi) = >. If so,
continues; otherwise, returns ⊥.
2) for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, compute Dj = Cj/(Aj)y . If
Dj = g, sets bj = 1, and if Dj = 1, sets bj = 0.
Otherwise, it responds to A with ⊥.





3Note that even if the set of binary values {bj} is not unique, the




jbj and that bj ∈ {0, 1}.
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C. Security Analysis.
It is not hard to verify that, in the above construction, any
signature created by Sig will be valid under Ver, and that any
signature created by the arbitrator using Res based on a partial
signature generated by PSig will be valid under Ver. To make
sure the correctness property of the above construction holds,
we show that any partial signature created by PSig will be
valid under PVer.
Given a partial signature σP = (c, S, T0, · · · , Tγ , c00,
c01, s00, s01, · · · , cγ0, cγ1, sγ0, sγ1, c̃, s̃0, s0, · · · , s̃γ , sγ)
generated by PSig, we verify the equations in PVer step by
step for clarity as follows.
1) Note that, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, if bj = 0, cj0 = c̃− cj1, sj0 =
tj0 − cj0rj ; otherwise, cj1 = c̃− cj0, sj1 = tj1 − cj1rj .
Thus the equation cj0 +cj1 = c̃ in step 1 of PVer holds.
2) Since S = gs, s = t − cxi, we have c =
H(PKi||g||S(Xi)c||m) = H(PKi||g||gs+cxi ||m) =
H(PKi||g||gt||m). The equation in step 2 of PVer holds.
3) Note that S =
∏γ
j=0 (Ej)
















s̃j . Besides, Cj = gbjY rj and when
bj = 0, Tj0 = Y tj0 , sj0 = tj0 − cj0rj , we have
Tj0 = Y
sj0+cj0rj = (Cj)




cj1Y sj1 holds unconditionally when bj = 0.




cj1Y sj1 also hold when bj = 1. That is, the
equations in step 3 of PVer hold.
4) Note that Aj = grj , Bj = hrj , Cj = gbjY rj , Ãj =
gtj , B̃j = h
tj , C̃j = g
t̃jY tj and s̃j = t̃j − c̃bj , sj =
tj − c̃rj . We have Ãj = gsj+c̃rj = gsj (Aj)c̃, B̃j =
hsj+c̃rj = hsj (Bj)
c̃, C̃j = g
s̃j+c̃bjY sj+c̃rj =
gs̃jY sj (Cj)
c̃. The equations in step 4 of PVer hold.
5) The equation in step 5 of PVer holds unconditionally
due to the fact that the same input to a hash function
always leads to the same output.
Thus any partial signature created by PSig will be valid under
PVer. The correctness property of the above construction
holds.
Since the signature generated by Sig and that generated by
the arbitrator using Res based on a valid partial signature are
both Schnorr signatures, the resolution ambiguity property also
holds.
Next we show the specific construction is secure in the
multi-user setting and chosen-key model reviewed in Sec-
tion II-B.
Theorem 1: The A*-OFE scheme is secure against signers in
the multi-user setting and chosen-key model under the discrete
logarithm assumption.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against
signers. We show how to construct an algorithm R that solves
the discrete logarithm problem. This will contradict with the
discrete logarithm assumption.
Note that algorithm R is given random elements u ∈ G.
Its goal is to output an integer α ∈ ZZq such that u = gα.
Algorithm R simulates the challenger and interacts with
adversary A as follows.
Setup. Algorithm R chooses a random integer y ∈ ZZq and
sets h = u, Y = hy . Note that the distributions of h, Y are
statistically close to the uniform distribution on G. R forwards
the values h, Y to adversary A, who returns its public key
PK∗ = XA.
Hash Queries. At any time adversary A can query the
random oracle H . To response to these queries, R maintains a
list of tuples 〈string(i), ci〉 as explained below. We refer to this
list as H-list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H at a point string ∈ {0, 1}∗, algorithm R responds
as follows:
1) If the query string already appears on the H-list in
some tuple 〈string, c〉, then algorithm R responds with
H(string) = c ∈ ZZq .
2) Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZq , adds the
tuple 〈string, c〉 to the H-list and responds to A as
H(string) = c ∈ ZZq .
Note that c is uniform in ZZq and is independent of A’s
current view as required.
Res Queries. Given a resolution query (m,σP ,PKi) where
PKi = Xi is the signer’s public key and σP :=
(c, S, T0, · · · , Tγ , · · · ), algorithm R responds to this query as
follows:
1) checks whether PVer(σP ,m,PKi) = >. If so, contin-
ues; otherwise, R responds to A with a special symbol
⊥.
2) for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, decompose Tj as Aj ||Bj ||Cj , and
compute Dj = Cj/(Bj)y . If Dj = g, sets bj = 1,
and if Dj = 1, sets bj = 0. Otherwise, R responds to
A with ⊥.





Output. It is easy to see that the above hash queries
and resolution queries are perfectly simulated. Finally, A
halts. It either admits failure, in which case so does R,
or it returns a partial signature σ∗P on message m
∗, where
σ∗P := (c




∗, s̃0∗, s∗0, · · · , s̃γ∗, s∗γ) and T ∗j = A∗j ||B∗j ||C∗j for
0 ≤ j ≤ γ, such that PVer(σ∗P ,m∗,PK
∗) = >, but it can not
be resolved to a valid full signature by the resolution algorithm
Res.
By the General Forking Lemma [23] (a standard rewinding
technique in random oracle model, which states that if an
adversary on inputs drawn from some distribution, produces
an output that has some property, then with non-negligible
probability, if the adversary is re-run on new inputs but
with the same random tape, its second output will also
have the property), with non-negligible probability algorithm
R is able to gain another partial signature σ′P (by run-
ning A again) on the same message m∗, where σ′P :=
(c∗, S∗, T ∗0 , · · · , T ∗γ , c′00, c′01, s′00, s′01, · · · , c′γ0, c′γ1, s′γ0, s′γ1,
c̃′, s̃0
′, s′0, · · · , s̃γ ′, s′γ) and c̃∗ 6= c̃, such that PVer(σP ′, m∗,
PK∗) = >, but it can not be resolved to a valid full signature
by the resolution algorithm Res.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that c̃′ > c̃∗.


















j . Let τj = (s̃j∗ −
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s̃j
′)(c̃′−c̃∗)−1, υi = (s∗j−s′j)(c̃′−c̃∗)−1. Hence C∗j = gτjY υj .











j = (B∗j )
c̃′hs
′
j , it follows A∗j = g
υi , B∗j = h
υi .
























and c′j0 + c
′
j1 = c̃
′, we have the following three cases:












































). It follows 1 = ghβ . Algorithm R can
simply output α = −β−1 and breaks the discrete logarithm
assumption when this case happens. Thus, we just safely omit
this case.














j1 . Denote υ′j = (s
∗
j1 − s′j1)(c′j1 −
c∗j1)
−1. Then we have C∗j = gY
υ′j . Since we already have
C∗j = g
τjY υj , it follows 1 ≡ gτj−1Y υj−υ
′
j . Thus it must be
the case τj = 1 and υi = υi′, as otherwise algorithm R can
simply output α = (1 − τj)(yυj − yυ′j)−1 and breaks the
discrete logarithm problem. Therefore C∗j = gY
υj when this
case happens.
case3 : If c∗j0 6= c′j0 and c∗j1 = c′j1, then likewise under the
discrete logarithm assumption we can gain that τj = 0 and
C∗j = Y






















From the above analysis, it is readily to see that the














that under the discrete logarithm assumption, the scheme is
secure against signers. 2
Theorem 2: The A*-OFE scheme is secure against the
arbitrator in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model under
the discrete logarithm assumption.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against
the arbitrator. We show how to construct an algorithm R that
solves the discrete logarithm problem. This will contradict
with the discrete logarithm assumption. Algorithm R is given
a random element X ∈ G as input, and its goal is to output
x ∈ ZZq such that gx = X .
Setup : R sets PK∗ := X and sends it to the arbitrator.
Hash Queries. Hash queries are simulated in the same way
as described in Theorem 1.
PSig Queries. At any time A can request a partial signature
under challenge key PK∗ = X . We respond to the ith partial
signing query on message m(i) as follows:
1) We choose c(i), s(i) ∈ ZZq at random, set
c(i) := H(PK∗||g||gs(i)Xc(i) ||m(i)), and add 〈PK∗|| g||
S(i)Xc
(i) || m(i), c(i)〉 where S(i) = gs(i) to the H-list.





j , where for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ,
b
(i)
j ∈ {0, 1}. We choose uniformly at random 0 ≤
r
(i)























3) We randomly choose c̃(i) ∈ ZZq . For 0 ≤ j ≤ δ, we




j1 ∈ ZZq , and
compute c(i)j1 = c̃













































































(i)|| · · · ||T̃γ
(i)
, and B(i) = T̃0












5) The partial signature is returned to A as σ(i)P :=
(c(i), S(i), T
(i)



























Output. It is obvious that the above hash queries and partial
signing queries are perfectly simulated. Finally, A halts. It
either admits failure, in which case so does R, or it returns a
full signature σ∗ on message m∗, where σ∗ := (c∗, s∗) such
that Ver(σ∗,m∗,PK∗) = >.
Suppose adversary A makes Qh hash queries and Qp partial
signing queries, and then produces a new full signature forgery.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp, let m(i) be the ith message submitted to
the partial signing oracle and σ(i)P := (c
(i), S(i) = gs
(i)
, · · · )
be the reply for this query. Let σ∗ := (c∗, s∗) be the
forgery on message m∗. If there does not exist an index
1 ≤ i ≤ Qp such that m(i) = m∗, c(i) = c∗, S(i) = gs
∗
,
then due to the randomness of the outputs of hash oracle,
with overwhelming probability A has submitted the string
X||g||gs∗Xc||m∗ to the hash query. Therefore by the General
Forking Lemma [23] (a rewinding technology in the random
oracle model), with non-negligible probability adversary A
is able to produces another full signature forgery σ′ on the
same message m∗, where σP := (c′, s′) such that c∗ 6= c′.
R thus have gs∗Xc∗ = gs′Xc′ . This enable R to output
x = (s∗ − s′)(c′ − c∗)−1 and break the discrete logarithm
assumption. 2
Theorem 3: The A*-OFE scheme is secure against verifiers
in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model under the
decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A makes Qh hash queries, Qp
partial signing queries and Qr resolution queries, and then
wins by producing a new full signature forgery σ∗ := (c∗, s∗)
on message m∗. For 1 ≤ i ≤ Qp, let m(i) be the ith message
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, · · · ) be the reply for this query. To show the security, we
first defines a sequence of games, and then show via a series
of claims that if A is successful against Game x, then it will
also be successful in Game x+ 1.
Game 0. This is the real experiment between the challenger
and an adversary A as defined in security against verifiers in
Section II-B, in the random oracle model. This means that
the challenger firstly correctly generates the arbitrator’s and
target signer’s key pairs by running algorithms SetupArb and
SetupUser, respectively. The challenger forwards the arbitra-
tor’s public key APK := (h, Y ) and target signer’s public key
PK∗ := X to the adversary A, and then provides accesses to
the hash oracle, partial signing oracle and resolution oracle as
well.
Game 1. This is the same as Game 0, with the exception that
we make it a rule that A fails if there does not exist an index
1 ≤ i ≤ Qp such that m(i) = m∗, c(i) = c∗, S(i) = gs
∗
.
Game 2. This is the same as Game 1, with the exception that
we simulate the challenger as follows. We choose at random
y1, y2 ∈ ZZq and set Y = gy1hy2 .
Hash Queries. The simulation of hash queries is exactly the
same as in Theorem 1.
PSig Queries. The simulation of partial signing queries is
exactly the same as in Theorem 2.
Res Queries. A can request a resolution query
(m,σP ,PKi) where PKi = Xi is a signer’s
public key and A may not know its corresponding
secret key, and σP := (c, S, T0, · · · , Tγ , c00, c01,
s00, s01, · · · , cγ0, cγ1, sγ0, sγ1, c̃, s̃0, s0, · · · , s̃γ , sγ). We
respond to this query as follows:
• check whether PVer(m,σP ,PKi) = >. If so, continue;
otherwise, return ⊥.
1) for 0 ≤ j ≤ δ, decompose Tj as Aj ||Bj ||Cj , and
compute Dj = Cj/(Aj)y1(Bj)y2 . If Dj = g, set
bj = 1, and if Dj = 1, set bj = 0. Otherwise,
respond to A with ⊥.




to A as the response.
• When PVer(σP ,m,PKi) = ⊥, respond to A with ⊥.
Game 3. This is the same as Game 2, with the exception that
at the beginning of the game we guess an index 1 ≤ i∗ ≤ Qp,
and A fails if m(i∗) 6= m∗, or c(i∗) 6= c∗, or S(i∗) 6= gs∗ .
Game 4. This is the same as Game 3, with the exception that
we make some changes to the i∗th partial signing oracle in the
above game. Namely, for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, instead of choosing
uniformly at random r(i
∗)























we choose independently and uniformly at random αj , βj , δj ∈













Game 5. This is the same as Game 4, with the exception
that for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, we randomly and independently choose









Next we link the probability that A wins in these games via
a series of claims. Let Sx be the event that A wins in Game
x.
Claim 1
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0]− εSAA, (1)
where εSAA is the advantage of an adversary A′ in the security
against the arbitrator discussed above.
Suppose A generates a new full signature forgery σ∗ :=
(c∗, s∗) on message m∗, but there does not exist an index
1 ≤ i ≤ Qp such that m(i) = m∗, c(i) = c∗, S(i) = gs
∗
.
Then we build an adversary B in the security against the
arbitrator. B correctly generates its key pair (ASK,APK)
by running algorithm SetupArb and then receives its own
target signer’s public key X . B forwards X and APK to A.
Whenever A requests a hash query or a partial signing query,
B submits this query to its own hash oracle or partial signing
oracle, respectively, and forwards the reply to A. Whenever
A requests a resolution query, B makes a resolution using its
secret key ASK. Note that the simulation is perfect. Finally
B outputs A’s forgery σ∗ := (c∗, s∗) on message m∗ and
wins in the security against the arbitrator that was discussed
in Theorem 2.
Claim 2
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ negl(k). (2)
Define F to be the event that in a resolution query in Game
2, PVer(σP ,m,PKi) = > but there exists some 1 ≤ j ≤ γ
such that Aj = gr, Bj = gr
′
but r 6= r′ mod q. If F does
not occur, with Aj = grj , Bj = hrj , then Y rj = (Aj)y1Bjy2 ;
therefore the decryption oracle computes Dj = Cj/Y rj , just
as it should be. That is to say, the Game 1 and Game 2 proceed
statistically indistinguishably, unless event F occurs. Thus we
have |Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Pr[F ], and only need to show that
Pr[F ] ≤ negl(k). To prove this inequality, it suffices to notice
that in a valid partial signature σP , a non-interactive proof of
knowledge PK{(rj) : Aj = grj ∧Bj = hrj} was essentially
conducted, and the knowledge error is negligible in k even for






The only difference between these Game 2 and Game 3 is
that we guess a random index i∗. This value is used nowhere
in the game, and independent to the adversary. Once the
adversary makes a forgery, we only declare him successful if
the index of his forgery matches our guess, which will occur
with 1/Qp probability.
Claim 4
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ l · εddh, (4)
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where εddh is the DDH-advantage of some efficient algorithm
R (and hence negligible under the DDH assumption).
To show this, we divide the transition from Game 3 to Game
4 into a sequence of sub-games from Game 0′ to Game (γ +
1)′. Game 0′ is exactly the same as Game 3. Game (j + 1)′
is the same as Game j′, with the exception that in the i∗th
partial signing query instead of choosing uniformly at random
r
(i∗)




































Note that Game (γ + 1)′ is exactly the same as Game 4. Let
Fj be the event that A wins in Game j′.
Next we show that any difference between Pr[Fj ] and
Pr[Fj+1] can be parlayed into a corresponding DDH-
advantage of an algorithm R. Algorithm R runs as follows.
It takes as input (g2, u1, u2), and interacts with A. R sets
h = g2. It simulates the oracles as in Game j′ except












y2 . If A outputs
a full signature σ∗ := (c∗, s∗) on message m∗ such that
m∗ = m(i




∗), R output 1, else output
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
When the input to R is of the form (g2, gr, gr2) where r is
randomly chosen, then computation proceeds just as in Game
j′. When the input to R is of the form (g2, gr, gr
′
2 ), where
r, r′ ∈ ZZq are independently uniformly chosen, we only need
to argue that ε = (u1)y1(u2)y2 is random to adversary A’s
view. If so, the simulation of R proceeds just the same as in
Game (j + 1)′.
To see this, consider the point Q = (y1, y2) ∈ ZZ2q . Let
g2 = g
w. At the beginning of the attack, this is a random
point on the line
logg Y = y1 + wy2, (5)
determined by the arbitrator’s public key. Note that the i∗th
partial signing query should not be submitted to the resolution
oracle, otherwise σ∗ := (c∗, s∗) will not be a new forgery
on message m∗ = m(i
∗). Thus, due to the same reason
as in Claim 2, with overwhelming probability the resolution
oracle only decrypts with respect to (Ai, Bi, Ci) of the form(




, and the adversary A obtains only
linear dependent relations ri logg Y = riy1 + riwy2 (since
(Ai)
y1(Bi)
y2 = griy1hriy1 = Y ri ). That means, no further
information about Q is leaked.






j ) of R’s partial
signing reply for A’s i∗th partial signing query. We have
logg ε = ry1 + r
′y2. (6)
Clearly, (5) and (6) are linearly independently when r 6= r′.
ε is a perfect one time pad, and thus random to the adversary
A’s view.
Therefore, for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, we have |Pr[Fj ] −
Pr[Fj+1]| ≤ εddh, which is followed by |Pr[S4] − Pr[S3]| =
|Pr[Fγ+1]−Pr[F0]| ≤ (γ + 1) · εddh. Note that l = γ + 1, the
claim holds.
Claim 5
Pr[S5] = Pr[S4]. (7)
Note that in game 5, gµj is a randomly chosen element from
G, the change from Game 5 to Game 4 was purely conceptual.
Thus we have Pr[S5] = Pr[S4].
Claim 6
Pr[S5] ≤ εdl, (8)
where εdl is the discrete logarithm advantage, (and hence
negligible under the discrete logarithm assumption).
To show this, we build a algorithm R that employs the ad-
versary A in Game 5 to solve the discrete logarithm problem.
Algorithm R runs as follows. It takes as input S. Its goal
is to output s ∈ ZZq such that gs = S. It interacts with A,
playing the role of the simulator in Game 5. R simulates the
environments in the same way as in Game 5 with the exception
that it sets S(i
∗) = S. The simulation is perfect. Finally when
A wins in Game 5 by outputting (c∗, s∗) on message m∗, R
outputs s = s∗ and solves the discrete logarithm problem.
Claim 7
AdvA(1
k) ≤ εSAA +Qp(l · εddh + εdl) + negl(k), (9)
where AdvA(1k) is advantage of A in the real experiment
defined in the multi-user setting and chosen key model.
As a sequence of equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8)
gained above, we have equation (9). The whole proof is done.
2
D. A Concrete Attack against A*-OFE in the Enhanced Model
We will show the above A*-OFE is insecure in our enhanced
model. When the arbitrator reveals its secret key y ∈ ZZq to
a signer whose secret/public key pair is (x,X = gx), the
malicious signer A can create a partial signature that passes
the inspection of partial signature verification algorithm, but
it can not be resolved to a valid full signature.
Taking further investigation into the above concrete con-
struction, one may observe that there is a loophole about the
proof made in the counterexample: the knowledge rj used in
the first part of the proof such that Cj = gsjY rj could be
different with the knowledge Rj used in the second part of
proof such that Cj = Y Rj or Cj = gY Rj . If that is true, the
value sj would not be 0 or 1. That is, the plaintext decrypted
by the arbitrator in this case would be gsj rather than the
identity element or the generator g of group G as it is supposed
to be, and thus the arbitrator will fail to make a resolution.
Note that finding rj , Rj such that Cj = gsjY rj and that
Cj = Y
Rj (or Cj = gY Rj ) while rj 6= Rj is hard if the
discrete logarithm of Y to the base g is unknown. However,
in our enhanced model, this discrete logarithm value is known,
and therefore finding such values rj , Rj is feasible. This is the
rationale of how our counterexample can be attacked when an
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adversary is allowed to have access to the arbitrator’s secret
key.
The concrete attack by A is as follows.
1) Choose a random t ∈ ZZq and compute c ∈ ZZq and
s ∈ ZZq such that
c = H(X||g||gt||m) and s = t− cx (in ZZq).
Note that s and y are independent and both random, thus
with probability 1/2 we have s ≥ y.
2) Let s =
∑γ
j=0 2




for each 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, bj , dj ∈ {0, 1}. Note that the
binary representation always exist and can be uniquely
determined. Denote S = gs, γ = ` − 1 and Ej = g2
j
for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ. Let further b′j = dj for 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, and






3) A chooses uniformly at random 0 ≤ rj ≤ ZZq for each
0 ≤ j ≤ γ, and computes
Aj = g
rj , Bj = h
rj , Cj = g
b′jY rj .
Note that a trick here that will be used by the malicious
signers is that
C0 = g
b′0Y r0 = gd0Y r0+1.
4) If d0 = 0, A chooses uniformly at random elements
t00, c01, s01 ∈ ZZq and sets
T00 = Y




Otherwise, A chooses uniformly at random
c00, s00, t01 ∈ ZZq , and sets
T00 = (Cj)




5) For 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, if b′j = 0, A chooses uniformly at
random elements tj0, cj1, sj1 ∈ ZZq and sets
Tj0 = Y




Otherwise, A chooses uniformly at random
cj0, sj0, tj1 ∈ ZZq , and sets
Tj0 = (Cj)




Besides, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, A chooses uniformly at random





t̃j , Ãj = g
tj , B̃j = h
tj , C̃j = g
t̃jY tj .
6) For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote T̃j = Ãj ||B̃j ||C̃j and T̃j
′
=
Tj0||Tj1. Let A = T̃0|| · · · ||T̃γ , and B = T̃0






X||c||S||m|| S̃ || A || B
)
.
If dj = 0, the A computes
c00 = c̃− c01(in ZZq), s00 = t00− c00(r0 + 1) (in ZZq).
Otherwise, A computes
c01 = c̃−c00 (in ZZq), s01 = t01−c01(r0 + 1) (in ZZq).
For 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, if b′j = 0, A computes
cj0 = c̃− cj1(in ZZq), sj0 = tj0 − cj0rj (in ZZq).
Otherwise, A computes
cj1 = c̃− cj0 (in ZZq), sj1 = tj1 − cj1rj (in ZZq).
Furthermore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, A computes
s̃j = t̃j − c̃b′j (in ZZq), sj = tj − c̃rj (in ZZq).
7) For 0 ≤ j ≤ γ, denote Tj = Aj ||Bj ||Cj . The
partial signature is set as σP := (c, S, T0, · · · , Tγ , c00,
c01, s00, s01, · · · , cγ0, cγ1, sγ0, sγ1, c̃, s̃0, s0, · · · , s̃γ , sγ).
It is easy to check that PVer(σP ,m,PKi) = >. Now, we
show that the resolution about this partial signature will return
the symbol ⊥, indicating failure. Indeed, the arbitrator will
compute Dj = Cj/(Aj)y for 0 ≤ j ≤ γ in a resolution
process. Since D0 = C0/(A0)y = gb
′
0 = gdiY , rather than
g or 1 as it should be. Thus the arbitrator will return ⊥ by
following the resolution algorithm. In this case, without any
doubt, verifiers would be disadvantaged with probability 1/2.
The malicious signer can also repeat step 1 several times, for
example n times, until a value s is found such that s ≥ y.
In this case, the signer can cheat with probability as least
1− 1/2n.
V. PREVIOUS PARADIGMS REVISITED
In this section, we revisit the commonly used approaches
in the construction of OFE in the enhanced security model.
A. Verifiably Encrypted Signature Paradigm
When Dodis et al. [16] proposed the security model of OFE
in the multi-user setting and the certified-key model, they also
showed that the popular paradigm for constructing OFE from
verifiably encrypted signatures still leads to secure schemes
in their model. Afterwards, Huang et al. [18] showed that
verifiably encrypted signature based generic construction of
OFE is also secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key
model. We will review the construction here and show that it is
also secure in our enhanced model with a slight modification,
which places an additional requirement to the underlying proof
system of the verifiably encrypted signature scheme.
Given a public-key encryption scheme E =
(KGen,Enc,Dec) and a signature scheme S =
(KGen,Sig,Ver), we assume that an encryption key
pair (ek, dk) and a signature key pair (sk, vk)
have been generated, respectively. Let Π be a non-
interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system
for the NP-language L = {(c,m, ek, vk)|∃σ
[c = E .Encek(σ) ∧ S.Vervk(m,σ) = 1]}. To partially
sign a message, the signer with secret key SKi := sk
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produces a signature σ using S on a message m and encrypts
the signature under the arbitrator’s public key APK := ek
to gain a ciphertext c. Then, the signer runs Π to generate
a NIZK proof π showing that c is indeed an encryption of
a signature σ on message m. The partial signature is set as
σP := (c, π). The signer’s full signature is set as σ. In a
resolution, the arbitrator simply uses its secret key ASK := dk
to decrypts the ciphertext c and returns the signature σ.
The correctness property of the construction from this
paradigm holds due to the correctness of the signature scheme
S and the encryption scheme E , and the completeness of the
NIZK proof system Π, which guarantees that a proof made
by an honest prover will always be accepted if the statement
being proven is true.
Note that the partial signature contains a ciphertext which
is the encryption of the signer’s full signature. The resolution
ambiguity property holds as a result of the fact that the
resolution process is just a decryption operation in which the
arbitrator decrypts the ciphertext and gains the signer’s full
signature.
Typically the security against signers in the multi-user
setting and chosen-key model is due to the soundness of the
NIZK proof system Π. The soundness property of ordinary
proof systems states that the prover should not be able to
convince the verifier of a false statement with non-negligible
probability. Normally the adversary in the soundness model is
only given the public parameters as input. Here, to make the
OFE schemes constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures
also secure in our enhanced model, we emphasize that the
soundness property of Π must hold even when the adversary
is also explicitly given the secret decryption key dk as input,
like the model of verifiable encryption discussed in [24].
For security against verifiers in the multi-user setting and
chosen key model, the simulation-sound property [25] is
required. Intuitively, the simulation-sound property states that
a polynomially bounded party is incapable of simulating a new
proof of a false statement even after having seen a number of
simulated proofs of its choice. This property guarantees that
an adversary in the security against verifiers experiment is
not able to submit a resolution query containing an accepting
proof of a false statement even after seeing a simulated proof
π generated by the simulator. Note that the soundness property
of Π does not need to hold in a stronger sense that the
adversary is also given the secret decryption key dk as input,
as a malicious verifier in an OFE scheme never should have
the arbitrator’s secret key ASK. Otherwise the verifier will
simply use it to decrypt a partial signature. Hence, we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 4: If E is a CCA2-secure encryption scheme, S
is UF-CMA-secure signature scheme, and Π is a simulation-
sound NIZK proof system in which soundness is preserved
even when an adversary is given the secret decryption key
dk as input, then the above OFE scheme constructed from
verifiably encrypted signatures is secure in our enhanced
model.
Proof. We only need to show the security against signers in
our enhanced model. To break it, an adversary has to generate
a partial signature σP = (c, π) on message m, where π is
an accepting proof but (c,m, ek, vk) 6∈ L. However, this is
infeasible even when the adversary has the secret decryption
key ASK = dk as input, because the soundness property of
Π now holds even when a dishonest prover is explicitly given
the secret decryption key dk as input.
The proof about security against verifiers and security
against the arbitrator is the same as that in [16], and therefore
we omit it. 2
B. Ring signature Paradigm
Huang et al. [18] showed that OFE schemes can be con-
structed based on conventional signatures and ring signatures,
and the constructed schemes are secure in the multi-user set-
ting and chosen-key model. We briefly review some intuitions
of the construction here.
Given a conventional signature scheme SIG =
(KGen,Sig,Ver) and a ring signature scheme
RS = (KGen,Sig,Ver), each signer has a key pair for
SIG and a key pair for RS. The arbitrator’s key pair is a key
pair for RS. To partially sign a message, the signer produces
a conventional signature σS using SIG. Note that the partial
signature in the OFE is set as σP := σS. The full signature
σ consists of the partial signature σS and a ring signature
σRS generated using RS with respect to message m and the
partial signature σP while the ring members are the signer
and the arbitrator. That is, σ = (σS, σRS). To resolve a partial
signature, the arbitrator simply uses its secret key for RS and
generates a ring signature σRS.
The correctness property of OFE protocols constructed
following this paradigm holds because of the fact that cor-
rectly generated conventional signatures and ring signatures
are always valid. The resolution ambiguity property follows
the basic anonymity property of a ring signature scheme,
which intuitively states that two ring signatures generated by
two different members from the same ring respectively are
indistinguishable.
Theorem 5: If SIG is a conventional signature scheme that is
UF-CMA-secure, and RS is a secure ring signature scheme that
is with basic anonymity and existential unforgeability under
an adaptive attack, against a static adversary, then the above
OFE scheme constructed from conventional signatures and
ring signatures is secure in our enhanced model.
Proof. We only need to show the security against signers in
our enhanced model. To break it, an adversary has to generate
a partial signature σP on message m, such that the arbitrator
is not able to generate a ring signature with respect to this
message m and the partial signature σP . However, this is
infeasible even if the adversary has the arbitrator’s secret key,
as the arbitrator can always do so under the ring consisting of
the adversary and itself, which holds unconditionally.
The proof about security against verifiers and security
against the arbitrator is the same as that in [18], and therefore,
we omit it. 2
VI. CONCLUSION
A typical meaningful work of modern cryptography is to
define proper security models able to capture practical attacks.
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Then protocols can be designed and evaluated based on these
models. In this paper, we addressed a previously being ignored
problem in OFE where a potentially dishonest arbitrator could
collude with a signer by sharing its secret key with the signer.
We proposed a new security model that for the first time
captures this issue, which can be viewed as an enhancement
of the previous models. A concrete OFE example was offered
to show that our enhanced model guarantees stronger security
than the previous models do. We also revisited the two well-
known general constructions of OFE protocols, namely the
construction based on verifiably encrypted signatures and that
based on ring signatures, and showed that protocols secure in
our enhanced model can still be constructed following these
two paradigms.
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[7] M. Rückert and D. Schröder, “Security of verifiably encrypted signatures
and a construction without random oracles,” in Proceedings of Pairing
09, 2009, pp. 17–34.
[8] Q. Huang, D. S. Wong, and W. Susilo, “Group-oriented fair exchange
of signatures,” Inf. Sci., vol. 181, pp. 3267–3283, August 2011.
[9] N. Asokan, V. Shoup, and M. Waidner, “Optimistic fair exchange of
digital signatures,” Eurocrypt 1998, LNCS 1403, pp. 591 – 606, 1998.
[10] D. Boneh, C. Gentry, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham, “Aggregate and
verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps,” Eurocrypt 2003,
LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 416–432, 2003.
[11] J. A. Garay, M. Jakobsson, and P. D. MacKenzie, “Abuse-free optimistic
contract signing,” in CRYPTO ’99. 1999, pp. 449–466.
[12] N. Asokan, V. Shoup, and M. Waidner, “Asynchronous protocols for
optimistic fair exchange,” in IEEE Symp on S&P, 1998, pp. 86–99.
[13] O. Markowitch and S. Kremer, “An optimistic non-repudiation protocol
with transparent trusted third party,” in ISC 2001, LNCS. 2001, pp. 363–
378.
[14] H. Zhu and F. Bao, “Stand-alone and setup-free verifiably committed
signatures,” in CT-RSA’06, LNCS, vol. 3860, 2006, pp. 159–173.
[15] Q. Huang, G. Yang, D. S. Wong, and W. Susilo, “Ambiguous optimistic
fair exchange,” in ASIACRYPT 2008, LNCS. 2008. pp. 74–89.
[16] Y. Dodis, P. J. Lee, and D. H. Yum, “Optimistic fair exchange in a
multi-user setting,” in Proc of PKC 07. 2007, pp. 118–133.
[17] H. Zhu, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, “Multi-party stand-alone and setup-free
verifiably committed signatures,” in Proc of PKC 07, 2007, pp. 134–149.
[18] Q. Huang, G. Yang, D. S. Wong, and W. Susilo, “Efficient optimistic
fair exchange secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model
without random oracles,” in Proc of the CT-RSA 2008, 2008, pp.
106–120.
[19] X. Huang, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, W. Wu, J. Zhou, and R. H. Deng,
“Preserving transparency and accountability in optimistic fair exchange
of digital signatures,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 498–512, 2011.
[20] B. Barak, R. Canetti, J. B. Nielsen, and R. Pass, “Universally compos-
able protocols with relaxed set-up assumptions.” in FOCS’04, 2004, pp.
186–195.
[21] A. W. Dent, “A survey of certificateless encryption schemes and security
models,” Int. J. Inf. Sec., vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 349–377, 2008.
[22] C.-P. Schnorr, “Efficient signature generation by smart cards,” J. Cryp-
tology, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 161–174, 1991.
[23] M. Bellare and G. Neven, “Multi-signatures in the plain public-key
model and a general forking lemma,” in Proc of the 13th ACM conf on
Computer and comm security, ser. CCS ’06. 2006, pp. 390–399.
[24] J. Camenisch and V. Shoup, “Practical verifiable encryption and decryp-
tion of discrete logarithms,” in CRYPTO, 2003, pp. 126–144.
[25] A. Sahai, “Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive
chosen-ciphertext security,” in Proc. of the 40th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, ser. FOCS ’99. 1999, pp. 543–553.
Yang Wang received his Ph.D. degree at the
School of Computer Science and Software Engineer-
ing, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Aus-
tralia. He is now a lecturer in Cyberspace Security
College, PLA Information Engineering University,
Zhengzhou, Henan 450002, China. His research in-
terests include applied cryptography, fair exchange
and security analysis of protocols.
Willy Susilo (SM01) received the Ph.D. degree
in computer science from the University of Wol-
longong, Wollongong, Australia. He is a Professor
with the School of Computer Science and Software
Engineering and the Director of Centre for Computer
and Information Security Research, University of
Wollongong. He currently holds the prestigious ARC
Future Fellow awarded by the Australian Research
Council. His main research interests include cryp-
tography and information security. His main contri-
bution is in the area of digital signature schemes. He
has published numerous publications in the area of digital signature schemes
and encryption schemes.
Man Ho Au (M12) obtained his bachelors (2003)
and masters (2005) degrees in the Department of In-
formation Engineering, Chinese University of Hong
Kong. He received his PhD from the University of
Wollongong (UOW) in July 2009. Currently, he is
a lecturer at the School of Computer Science and
Software Engineering, UOW. He works in the area
of information security. In particular, his research
interests include applying public-key cryptographic
techniques to systems with security and privacy
concerns. He has published over 60 referred journal
and conference papers, including 2 papers in the ACM CCS conference that
were named as ’Runners-up for PET Award 2009: Outstanding Research in
Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
Guilin Wang received his PhD degree (2001) in
computer science from the Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, China. He is cur-
rently a senior researcher with Huawei International
Pte Ltd, Singapore. Before joining Huawei in Sept
of 2013, he was a senior lecturer in the University of
Wollongong, Australia; a lecturer in the University
of Birmingham, UK, and a research scientist in the
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R), Singapore.
His research interest is mainly in the area of applied
cryptography and its applications, in particular, the
design and analysis of digital signatures and security protocols.
